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INTRODUCTION
The issue of plastic waste has recently gained traction,
attributed in part to images of the impact of plastic
waste in marine ecosystems shown in BBC’s and Sir
David Attenborough’s Planet Earth II1 series and other
headlines reporting on, for example, the Chinese ban
on the import of certain plastic wastes2 and the
environmental costs of plastics in fast fashion.3 Much
data exists to warrant the growing concern about plastic
waste. Jambeck and others calculate that 4.8 to 12.7
million metric tonnes of plastic waste flowed into the
oceans from coastal regions in 2010, which is only
expected to have increased since then.4 Furthermore,
there is evidence that this plastic waste ends up in our
food chains and is ingested by us, with the overall
human health implications of this still unclear and
requiring further research (though there is initial evidence
that certain plastic waste can have harmful effects).5
Beyond environmental and social repercussions of
plastic waste, there are also huge economic costs: the
report Valuing Plastic  estimates the cost of
environmental damage to marine ecosystems by plastic
waste at around US$13 billion;6 the Asia-Pacific
Economic Cooperation calculates the cumulative cost
of plastic waste in the Asia-Pacific oceans at US$1.3
billion to local tourism, and fishing and shipping
industries;7 and the European Commission states that
the potential costs for coastal and beach cleaning in
Europe could reach EUR630 million per year.8
The plastic waste crisis can in part be addressed through
effective waste management (though other critical
issues, including, inter alia, the scale of plastic
consumption and the composition of certain plastics
also need to be addressed, but are beyond the scope
of this article). A circular economy approach to plastics
has been recommended to improve plastic waste
management to prevent plastic waste being ‘wasted’.9
Many circular economy definitions are in circulation.
In essence, it is a system based on the reuse, recycling,
and recovery of materials to achieve economic
Law, Environment and Development Journal
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1 Sid Hayns-Worthington, ‘The Attenborough Effect:
Searches for Plastic Recycling Rocket after Blue Planet II’
(Resource, 5 January 2018) <https://resource.co/article/
attenborough-effect-searches-plastic-recycling-rocket-
after-blue-planet-ii-12334>.
2 Eg Laura Parker and Kennedy Elliott, ‘Plastic Recycling is
Broken. Here’s How to Fix It’ (National Geographic, 20 June
2018) <https://news.nationalgeographic.com/2018/06/china-
plastic-recycling-ban-solutions-science-environment>;
Karen McVeigh, ‘Huge Rise in US Plastic Waste Shipments
to Poor Countries Following China Ban’ (The Guardian, 5
October 2018) <www.theguardian.com/global-development
/2018/oct/05/huge-rise-us-plastic-waste-shipments-to-
poor-countries-china-ban-thailand-malaysia-vietnam>.
3 Eg Ellen MacArthur Foundation, ‘One Garbage Truck of
Textiles Wasted Every Second: Report Creates Vision for
Change’ (Ellen MacArthur Foundation, 28 November 2017)
<www.ellenmacarthurfoundation.org/news/one-garbage-
truck-of-textiles-wasted-every-second-report-creates-
vision-for-change>; Patsy Perry, ‘The Environmental Costs
of Fast Fashion’ (The Conversation, 27 December 2017)
<https://theconversation.com/read-this-before-you-go-sales-
shopping-the-environmental-costs-of-fast-fashion-88373>.
4 Jemma R Jambeck and others,  ‘Plastic Waste Inputs from
Land into the Ocean’ (2015) 347(6223) Science 768, 770.
5 Lisbeth Van Cauwenberghe and Colin R Janssen,
‘Microplastics in Bivalves Cultured for Human
Consumption’ (2014) 193 Environmental Pollution 65; P
Schwabl and others, ‘Assessment of Microplastic Concentrations
in Human Stool – Preliminary Results of a Prospective
Study’ (UEG Week 2018, Vienna, 24 October, 2018).
6 UNEP, Valuing Plastics: The Business Case for Measuring ,
Managing and Disclosing Plastic Use in Consumer Goods Industry
(UNEP 2014) 12.
7 A McIlgorm, HF Campbell and MJ Rule, ‘Understanding
the Economic Benefits and Costs of Controlling Marine
Debris in the APEC Region (MRC 02/2007)’ (2007)
Report to the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
Marine Resource Conservation Working Group by the
National Marine Science Centre (University of New
England and Southern Cross University), 11-12
<www.nowpap.org/data/ML%20ref/APEC%27ML-
control...Cost-vs-Benefit.pdf>.
8 European Commission, ‘Our Oceans, Seas and Coasts –
Descriptor 10: Marine Litter’ (European Commission, 2018)
<http://ec.europa.eu/environment/marine/good-
environmental-status/descriptor-10/index_en.htm>.
9 Eg World Economic Forum, Ellen MacArthur
Foundation and McKinsey & Company, The New Plastics
Economy – Rethinking the Future of Plastics (Ellen MacArthur
Foundation 2016); Sofie Huysman and others,
‘Performance Indicators for a Circular Economy: A Case
Study on Post-industrial Plastic Waste’ (2017) 120
Resources, Conservation and Recycling 46; Patrick ten
Brink and others, ‘Circular Economy Measures to Keep
Plastics and their Value in the Economy, Avoid Waste
and Reduce Marine Litter’ (2018) Economics Discussions
Papers No 2018-3, Kiel Institute for the World Economy
< w w w. e c o n o m i c s - e j o u r n a l . o r g / e c o n o m i c s /
discussionpapers/2018-3>.
prosperity, environmental protection, and social
equity.10 Critically, plastic waste would be conceived as
a resource to be reused, recycled or recovered. McKinsey
estimates that the global value of resource efficiency
gains could eventually reach benefits of US$3.7 trillion
per year.11 Moreover, circularity design principles can
stabilise a delicate international resource and waste
management system, avoiding future scenarios
repeating the recent, widespread international
repercussions caused by the introduction of a Chinese
ban on the import of certain wastes – for example,
Indonesia, Vietnam, and Taiwan have introduced heavy
restrictions as a result of the increased amounts of
plastic wastes being imported.12
Laws and policies at different government levels are
supporting transitions towards circular economy
approaches. Examples include the European Union's
(EU) 2015 Circular Economy Action Plan13,  as part
of which the Strategy for Plastics in the Circular
Economy14 was adopted in 2018. This includes a
proposal for a directive on the reduction of the impact
of certain plastic products on the environment.15
National examples include China's Circular Economy
Promotion Law 2008,16  Germany's Closed Substance
Cycle and Waste Management Act of  1996,17 and
Japan's 2000 Fundamental Law for Establishing a
Sound Material-cycle Society.18 Laws and policies have
also had a role to play in local manifestations of circular
economies (called ‘industrial symbiosis’ or ‘eco-
industrial parks’) in, for example, Denmark, the
Netherlands, Sweden, and the UK.19 Beyond the top-
down approach, there are private and voluntary
stakeholders driving implementation of circular
approaches: the British Plastics Federation has
published Plastics: A Vision for a Circular Economy’.20
PlasticsEurope, a pan-European association of plastic
manufacturers in Europe, is examining the circular
economy as a sustainable model for plastics;21 and the
Ellen MacArthur Foundation is leading the New
Plastics Economy initiative to bring together key
stakeholders to rethink and redesign the future of
plastics.22 These are all, however, relatively isolated
stories of success23 and the actual implementation of
circular approaches remains ‘limited and fragile’.24 More
research is therefore needed on the law and policy
instruments that can enable circular economies for
resources and waste, including plastics.25
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10 Julian Kirchherr, Denise Reike and Marko Hekkert,
‘Conceptualizing the Circular Economy: An Analysis of
114 Definitions’ (2017) 127 Resources, Conservation &
Recycling 221, 224-225.
11 Richard Dobbs and others, Resource Revolution: Meeting the
World’s Energy, Materials, Food, and Water Needs (McKinsey
Global Institute and McKinsey Sustainability & Resource
Productivity Practice 2011) 10.
12 Roger Harrabin and Tom Edgington, ‘Recycling: Where
is the Plastic Waste Mountain?’ BBC (1 January 2019)
< w w w. b b c . c o . u k / n e w s / s c i e n c e - e nv i r o n m e n t -
46566795>.
13 Commission, ‘Closing the Loop – An EU Action Plan
for the Circular Economy’ (Communication)
COM(2015) 614 final.
14 Commission, ‘A European Strategy for Plastics in a
Circular Economy’ (Communication) COM(2018) 28
final.
15 Commission, ‘Proposal for a Directive of the European
Parliament and of the Council on the Reduction of the
Impact of Certain Plastic Products on the Environment’
(Communication) COM(2018) 340 final 2.
16 Circular Economy Promotion Law of  the People’s
Republic of China (promulgated by The Standing
Committee of  the National People’s Congress, August
29, 2008), effective January 1, 2009.
17 Act for Promoting Closed Substance Cycle Waste
Management and Ensuing Environmentally Compatible
Waste Disposal (Gesetz zur Förderung der
Kreislaufwirtschaft und Sicherung der umweltverträglichen
Beseitigung von Abfällen) v. 27.9.1994, BGBI.I 1994, p.
2705.
18 The Basic Act for Establishing a Sound Material-Cycle
Society, Act No.110 of  2 June 2000.
19 Katrien Steenmans, ‘Enabling Industrial Symbiosis
Through Regulations, Policies, and Property Rights’ (PhD
thesis, University of Surrey 2018) 256-265.
20 British Plastics Federation, Plastics: A Vision for a Circular
Economy: Improving the Environment for the Next Generation
(British Plastics Federation 2018).
21 PlasticsEurope, ‘Plastics’ Contribution to the Circular
Economy’ (PlasticsEurope, 2018) <www.plasticseurope.org/
en/focus-areas/circular-economy>.
22 New Plastics Economy, ‘New Plastics Economy’ (2018)
<https://newplasticseconomy.org>.
23 John A Mathews and Hao Tan, ‘Circular Economy: Lessons
from China’ (2016) 531 Nature 440, 441.
24 Nicky Gregson and others, ‘Interrogating the Circular
Economy: The Moral Economy of Resource Recovery
in the EU’ (2015) 44(2) Economy and Society 218, 218.
25 Steenmans (n 19) 292-293. See also: Katrien Steenmans,
Rosalind Malcolm and Jane Marriott, ‘Commodification
of  Waste: Legal and Theoretical Approaches to Industrial
Symbiosis as Part of a Circular Economy’ (2017) University
of Oslo Faculty of Law Legal Studies Research Paper
2017-26.
Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR) is a legal tool
that has been identified as one of the key opportunities
‘for further development of regulatory and policy
instruments to enable’ circular economy approaches,26
and therefore also a potentially valuable tool for
incentivising more effective plastic waste management.
In essence, EPR is where the producer of a product
retains responsibility of some form for the product
throughout its life cycle, including when it becomes
waste.  There has been a substantial increase in
implementation and interest in EPR schemes over
the last decade, as well as a growth in academic literature
on the economics of EPR,27 with Sachs describing it
in 2006 as ‘one of the most significant developments
in global environmental policy in the last decade’.28
The concept of EPR has been incorporated at EU
level.29 The focus of this article is on its inclusion in
the 2008 Waste Framework Directive (WFD),30 the
cornerstone of  EU waste law. The EU implementation
of EPR has, however, been criticised in the literature
and is therefore considered to have limited impact.31
These limitations need to be addressed in order to
increase EPR’s effectiveness. Directive 2018/85132
amended the 2008 WFD with its aim in part to clarify
the EPR provisions.33 This article assesses these
amendments to EPR by investigating the particular
question: To what extent do the Directive 2018/851
amendments to the 2008 WFD EPR scheme address
criticisms of EPR for the purpose of facilitating
transitions towards circular economies? This question
is explored by adopting a doctrinal approach and
drawing on examples in the context of plastic waste.
For the purpose of the overarching research question,
the remainder of the article is structured as follows.
The next section, Section 2, examines the concept of
EPR in more detail, including its anticipated benefits
and alignment with the circular economy. The
subsequent section, Section 3, then evaluates EPR
within the 2008 WFD. Section 4 sets out the recent
amendments to the EPR scheme introduced by
Directive 2018/851 including how these address some
of the criticisms, and discusses some of the
developments on the horizon that may affect the scope
and effectiveness of EPR schemes, particularly within
the plastic waste context.  The final section concludes.
2
UNDERSTANDING EXTENDED
PRODUCER RESPONSIBILITY
In this section, the concept of EPR is detailed by
describing the different forms in which it can exist,
together with its general advantages and limitations.
This understanding is then used in subsequent sections
to understand the particular EU implementation of
the concept, and identify potential gaps and
opportunities.
The concept of EPR, where responsibilities for waste
management are shifted from consumers and
authorities (those traditionally made responsible) to
the producer of a product, has been around for a
Law, Environment and Development Journal
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26 Steenmans (n 19) 290. See also: Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development, ‘Working Party on
Resource Productivity and Waste’ (OECD 2015); ten Brink
and others (n 9) 6 and 9; Nathan Kunz, Kieren Mayers and
Luk N Van Wassenhove, ‘Stakeholder Views on Extended
Producer Responsibility and the Circular Economy’
(2018) 60(3) California Management Review 45, 46; Zhe
Liu, Michelle Adams and Tony R Walker, ‘Are Exports of
Recyclables from Developed to Developing Countries
Waste Pollution Transfer or Part of  the Global Circular
Economy’ (2018) 136 Resources, Conservation &
Recycling 22, 23.
27 Garth T Hickle, ‘An Examination of  Governance within
Extended Producer Responsibility Policy Regimes in
North America’ (2014) 92 Resources, Conservation and
Recycling 55, 56; Daniel Kaffine and Patrick O’Reilly,
‘What Have We Learned about Extended Producer
Responsibility in the Past Decade? A Survey of the Recent
EPR Economic Literature’ (ENV/EPOC/
WPRPW(2013)final, OECD, 21 January 2015) 4; Sergio
Rubio and others, ‘Effectiveness of Extended Producer
Responsibility Policies Implementation: The Case of
Portuguese and Spanish Packaging Waste Systems’ (2019)
210 Journal of Cleaner Production 217, 218.
28 Noah Sachs, ‘Planning the Funeral at the Birth: Extended
Producer Responsibility in the European Union and the United
States’ (2006) 30 Harvard Environmental Law Review 51, 54.
29 See Section 2.
30 Directive 2008/98/EC of 19 June November 2008 on
waste and repealing certain Directives [2008] OJ L312/3
(2008 WFD).
31 See Section 3.
32 Directive 2018/851 of 30 May 2018 amending Directive
2008/98/EC on waste [2018] OJ L 150/109.
33 Directive 2018/851, recital 9. See also Section 4.
number of decades. Xerox, a company offering
products including photocopiers, has, for example,
been ‘taking back’ its products since the 1960s, though
this was not formalised, for environmental purposes
until their Asset Recycle Management Program
introduced in 1991.34 In contrast, it was not until a
few decades later that EPR was explicitly recognised at
national level. EPR was formulated and developed by
Lindhqvist in a 1990 report to the Swedish Ministry
of the Environment,35 and in the same year the
German Minister of the Environment, Hans Töpfer,
proposed an EPR approach for the Ordinance on the
Avoidance of  Packaging Waste (Verpackungsverordnung).36
This Ordinance became effective in 1991 and was the
first practical application of EPR in the EU (called the
German Green Dot scheme).37 Within a decade, EPR
approaches were seen more widely and were
incorporated at EU level, first in 2000 in the End-of-
Life Vehicles Directive38 and subsequently in the Waste
Electrical and Electronic Equipment Directive39 and
2008 WFD.
The types of responsibilities that can be assigned
under EPR schemes, and the benefits and challenges
of the concept are examined in the next sections. These
types will be used to examine EPR to facilitate an
analysis of the EU implementation of the concept in
Sections 3 and 4.
2.1 Types of Extended Producer
Responsibility
Lindhqvist distinguished between four types of
producer responsibility.40 These categorisations are
useful because they provide a foundational
understanding of EPR schemes and the incentives
provided by them. The categories are:41
• Physical responsibility is where the producer is
involved in physical end-of-life management
of the products and/or their effects through
development of technology or provision of
services. For example, Xerox physically took
products back as part of their Asset Recycle
Management Program. The intended
advantages included providing ‘the necessary
leadership, strategy, design principles,
operational and technical support to
maximize global recycling … resulting in a
major competitive, as well as environmental
advantage for Xerox’.42
• Economic responsibility is where a producer
covers all or part of the costs (directly or by a
special fee) for managing the wastes at the
product’s end-of-life, for example, for the
collection, processing, and disposal. In the
Netherlands, for example, the Packaging
Extended Producer Responsibility in the EU
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34 JA Scott and others, ‘Concepts and Methodologies to
Help Promote Industrial Ecology’ in Christian N Madu
(ed), Handbook of Environmentally Conscious Manufacturing
(Springer Science+Business Media 2000) 40; Wendy Kerr
and Chris Ryan, ‘Eco-efficiency Gains from
Remanufacturing: A Case Study of Photocopier
Remanufacturing at Fuji Xerox Australia’ (2001) 9 Journal
of Cleaner Production 75, 77.
35 Thomas Lindhqvist and Karl Lidgren, ‘Modeller för
Förlängt Producentansvar’ in Ministry of the
Environment (ed), Fran Vaggan til Graven – Sex Studier av
Varors Miljöpåverken (Allmänna förl 1990); Thomas
Lindhqvist, ‘Extended Producer Responsibility in
Cleaner Production: Policy Principle to Promote
Environmental Improvements of Product Systems’ (PhD
thesis, Lund University 2000) ii.
36 Ordinance on the Avoidance of  Packaging Waste
(Verpackungsverordnung – VerpackV) v.20.6.1991, BGBI.I
1991, p. 1234. Note that this version is no longer in
force.
37 For more information, see eg: Eric Neumayer, ‘German
Packaging Waste Management: A Successful Voluntary
Agreement with Less Successful Environmental Effects’
(2000) 10 European Environment 152; Per Olof Busch
and Helge Jörgens, ‘Breaking the Deadlock – Voluntary
Agreements and Regulatory Measures in German Waste
Management’ (ECPR, Grenoble, 2001) <https://ecpr.eu/
Filestore/PaperProposal/13ccd0de-228d-413f-8656-
7d61f4fc1f2f.pdf >; Sachs (n 28) 68.
38 Directive 2000/53/ECL of 18 September 2000 on end-
of-life vehicles [2000] OJ L269/34. The phrase ‘extended
producer responsibility’ is not used. Instead, the concept
is embodied by the responsibilities assigned in the
Directive of collecting (art 5), treating (art 6), and reusing
and recovering (art 7).
39 Council Directive 2012/19/EU of 4 July 2012 on waste
electrical and electronic equipment [2012] OJ L197/38
(WEEE Directive). Similarly to the End of  Vehicles
Directive, this makes no reference to ‘extended producer
responsibility’ but refer to treatment (art 6) and recovery
(art 7).
40 Lindhqvist (n 35) 38-39.
41 ibid.
42 Scott and others (n 34) 40.
informative responsibility 
liability 
property 
rights 
economic 
responsibility 
physical 
responsibility 
Figure 1. Types of  EPR. Adapted from Lindhqvist
(2000).48
2.2 Advantages and Limitations
There are a number of general advantages and
limitations of EPR schemes, which are set out below
to understand the general concept of EPR. These are
referred to in subsequent sections to examine whether
the particular EU implementation of the concept has
underpinned or detracted from these advantages, and
addressed or disregarded the disadvantages.
First, EPR is a manifestation of the polluter-pays
principle, which is that the person who caused the
pollution should pay the costs of it and where waste
is conceived as pollution.49 EPR therefore supports a
key principle of EU environmental law50 by
operationalising it within a mechanism, while
simultaneously the principle provides a legal policy
basis in the EU context for EPR. Economic
responsibility is a clear ‘logical extension’ of the
Decision 2014 states that the producer is
responsible for the costs of separate collection
or collection and subsequent separation of
packaging (including plastics).43
• Liability is where responsibility for
environmental damages caused by a
product is borne by its producer. This may
encompass damages occurring at various
stages in the life cycle including use and final
disposal.
• Informative responsibility is where the producer
is required to provide information on the
product and its environmental effects in
various life cycle stages, such as on the
polluting effects of waste produced by the
product.
The EPR types are not necessarily distinct and can
overlap and be simultaneously present, as illustrated
in Figure 1. The Dutch Packing Decision 2014, for
example, also requires informative responsibility (there
are reporting obligations if a producer places and
removes more than 50,000 kg of packaging waste
annually)44 and physical responsibility (the producer
is responsible for separate intake or collection and
separation of packaging)45 in addition to the economic
responsibility highlighted above. When all other EPR
types are present, then Lindhqvist states there is
ownership,46 though this has been re-labelled as
‘property rights’ in Figure 1 to indicate that other
property rights may be relevant under other
responsibility schemes. A discussion of the property
rights in relation to the different types of responsibility
is beyond the scope of this article, but it is
recommended as a potential useful tool to increase the
effectiveness of EPR schemes as property rights in
waste can affect treatment of waste.47
Law, Environment and Development Journal
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43 Besluit beheer verpakkingen van 2014 [Dutch Packaging
Decision 2014], art 5(2).
44 Dutch Packaging Decision 2014, art 8.
45 Dutch Packaging Decision 2014, art 5(1).
46 Lindhqvist (n 35) 38-39.
47 See eg Steenmans, Malcolm and Marriott (n 25).
48 Thomas Lindhqvist, ‘Extended Producer Responsibility
in Cleaner Production: Policy Principle to Promote
Environmental Improvements of Product Systems’ (PhD
thesis, Lund University 2000) 38.
49 For a discussion on whether waste is pollution or not,
please see: Steenmans (n 19) 6-8.
50 Treaty on the Functioning of  the European Union [2012]
OJ C326/49, art 191(2).
polluter-pays principle,51 as the producer of the
product has to pay for waste management of product.
The other types of responsibility can similarly have
cost implications for the producers; financing is
required to collect and produce information, and
organise physical responsibility of waste. Some
industry stakeholders’ groups have argued that EPR
distorts the Polluter Pays Principle
because it is consumers, not producers,
that are the ‘polluters’ in the context of
product externalities. Consumers
actually introduce products into the
environment by discarding them,
whereas producers are making a useful
product, not a waste. In this view,
product externalities such as waste
disposal cost or environmental impacts
of disposal are caused by the
consumer’s decision to consume, not
the producer’s decision to produce.52
Therefore, the preventive principle, which sets out to
prevent the creation of pollution or nuisance at
source,53 may provide a more appropriate basis for
EPR as the producer is the original ‘creator’ of the
product that may lead to pollution. Principles of
industrial ecology – a field focused on cycling resources
like natural ecosystems54 – can, however, be applied
to explain why producers can still be considered the
polluters: ‘environmental externalities have their origin
in the design decisions for the products produced in
the factor, and indeed, in the decision to produce a
certain product in the first place’.55 Additional
arguments to explain the producers as the polluters
can also highlight the role of producers in creating or
increasing a demand and desire amongst consumers
to consume that product, which then leads to pollution.
Furthermore, the concept of EPR resonates
metaphorically with the concept of the circular
economy, as both seek to move from linear and
unidirectional to cyclical and closed loops,56 so it can
result in similar benefits described by Kirchherr and
others.57 Liu and others have even described EPR as
one of the legal mechanisms needed to help reshape
and rebalance circular economy approaches.58
Although some argue that the general concept of EPR
deviates from circular approaches, as EPR is largely
focused on improving the recycling of materials rather
than the reuse and repair, which are prioritised by
circular economy approaches.59
Another advantage of EPR is the shifting of physical
and economic responsibilities, which can incentivise
producers, instead of local authorities, to innovate,
access specialised expertise regarding the product design
and technology development, and incorporate ‘green’
design and effective waste management schemes into
their overall production strategies.60 EPR is therefore
a market-based scheme, as producers internalise the
costs of externalities.61 This has resulted in some
scholars describing EPR as a ‘next generation’
environmental policy that relies on market incentives
instead of traditional command-and-control
mandates.62 As this advantage illustrates, the shifting
of physical and financial responsibilities are usually
Extended Producer Responsibility in the EU
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51 KH Forslind, ‘Implementing Extended Producer
Responsibility: The Case of  Sweden’s Car Scrapping
Scheme’ (2005) 13 Journal of Cleaner Production 619,
620. See also eg: Scott and others (n 34) 40; Nicole C
Kibert, ‘Extended Producer Responsibility: A Tool for
Achieving Sustainable Development’ (2004) 19(2) Journal
of Land Use 503, 504.
52 Sachs (n 28) 65.
53 Included in the WFD in Article 4(1) through prioritising
the prevention of  waste in the waste hierarchy.
54 Eg Robert A Frosch and Nicholas E Gallopoulos,
‘Strategies for Manufacturing’ (1989) 189 Scientific
American 152, 152.
55 Sachs (n 28) 66.
56 Reid Lifset, Atalay Atasu and Naoko Tojo, ‘Extended
Producer Responsibility: National, International and
Practical Perspective’ (2013) 17(2) Journal of Industrial
Ecology 162, 162.
57 See text to n 10.
58 Liu and others (n 26) 23.
59 Kunz and others (n 26) 46; Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development, ‘Working Party on
Resource Productivity and Waste’ (OECD 2015).
60 Maria Lee, ‘New Generation Regulation? The Case of
End-of-Life Vehicle’ (2002) 11(4) European
Environmental Law Review 114, 116; Alice Castell,
Roland Clift and Chris France, ‘Extended Producer
Responsibility in the European Union: A Horse or a
Camel?’(2004) 8(1-2) Journal of Industrial Ecology 4, 4.
61 Eg OECD, Instrument Mixes for Environmental Policy (OECD
Publishing 2007) 158.
62 Eg Neil Gunningham and Darren Sinclair, Leaders and
Lag gards: Next Generation Envir onmental Regulation
(Greenleaf Publishing 2002) 198; Sachs (n 28) 53.
highlighted as providing the core rationale for
implementing EPR schemes.63 The emphasis on these
types of EPR is mirrored in practice; across an
examination of four case studies in Denmark,
Netherlands, Sweden, and the UK, where EPR was
found to be predominantly present in the form of
economic responsibility, and sometimes physical or
informative responsibility.64 This limits the potential
overall impact of EPR schemes as it under-utilises the
benefits offered by the other types of  responsibility.
The final advantage of EPR schemes discussed in this
section is the underlying motivation to achieve
economic, environmental and social benefits.65
Evidence exists that EPR schemes have resulted in
significant economic and environment benefits both
in and outside the EU. For example, it is estimated that
the EPR programmes for electronics, mercury
thermostats, paint, and mattresses in the US state of
Connecticut resulted in: (1) the diversion of more than
26 million pounds of materials from waste; (2)
cumulative cost savings of more than US$2.6 per
annum to Connecticut municipalities; (3) services worth
another US$6.7 million that created more than 100 jobs;
and (4) reduced greenhouse gas emissions by more
than 13 million kg of carbon dioxide equivalent.66 In
Germany, the Packaging Ordinance between 1992 and
1993 reduced the volume of packaging by 1 million
tonnes and saved the cost of waste not gone to final
disposal by an estimated US$2.1 billion.67
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Simultaneously, there are not always economic
advantages to EPR schemes; EPR schemes are likely
to be implemented with increased costs to industry
and society.68 It can be particularly expensive to set up
an EPR system for an individual producer. In order to
reduce costs, some companies can organise themselves
collectively and create a producer responsibility
organisation. The primary task of such an organisation
is to set up and manage the infrastructures needed to
collect and process waste on behalf of their individual
members. But, the formation and operation of
producer responsibility organisations ‘has garnered
scrutiny from competition authorities and often
necessitated a legislative response … to facilitate their
functioning through exemption from state
competitive conduct laws’.69 Additionally,
environmental benefits may not always be reaped. Some
EPR schemes that include weight-based fee structures
have led to a focus on light-weighting, or, for example,
the Dutch Packaging System only applies informative
responsibility if a weight threshold is met.70 Such
schemes risk rewarding lighter, and not necessarily more
recyclable, materials.71
Finally, Stahel argues that overall the concept of
‘responsibility’ itself is too weak (though this arguably
depends on the type of responsibility and could be as
a result of a labelling issue of liability v
responsibility);72 he observes that only relatively few
producers have changed their industrial design
priorities or installed buy-back strategies to
components or molecules for reuse as a result of
EPR.73 Watkins and others support this view of  EPR,
9
63 Harri Kalimo and others, ‘Greening the Economy
through Design Incentives: Allocating Extended
Producer Responsibility’ (2012) 21(6) EELR 274, 274.
64 Steenmans (n 19) 262.
65 Atalay Atasu, ‘Operational Perspectives on Extended
Producer Responsibility’ (forthcoming) Journal of
Industrial Ecology 1, 1.
66 Connecticut – Product Stewardship Institute, Connecticut
Extended Producer Responsibility Program Evaluation: Summary
and Recommendations (Product Stewardship Institute 2017).
Note that these figures are estimates as data on recovery
rates and recycling/disposal costs were limited.
67 Environment Policy Committee, Extended Producer
Responsibility Phase 2: Case Study on the German Packaging
Ordinance (Working Paper ENV/EPOC.PPC(97)21/REV2,
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development, May 1998) 24. Based on a conversion rate
of US$1 = 1 Deutsche Mark – the exchange rate in 1993
according to: Harold Marcuse, ‘Historical Dollar-to-Marks
Currency Conversion Page’ (7 October 2018)
<www.history.ucsb.edu/faculty/marcuse/projects/
currency.htm>.
68 Kieren Mayers and Scott Butler, ‘Producer Responsibility
Organisations Development and Organisations: A Case
Study’ (2013) 17(2) Journal of  Industrial Ecology, 287.
69 Hickle (n 27) 56-57.
70 See text to n 44.
71 Emma Watkins and others, EPR in the EU Plastics Strategy
and Circular Economy: A Focus on Plastic Packaging (Institute
for European Environmental Policy 2017) 2.
72 Labeling theory addresses the effects and influence of
labels on individuals their behaviour. See eg: Erving
Goffman, Stigma: Notes on the Management of Spoiled Identity
(Prentice Hall 1963); Howard Becker, Outsiders (Free Press
1973); Michael Petrunik, ‘The Rise and Fall of “Labelling
Theory”: The Construction and Destruction of a
Sociological Strawman’ (1980) 5(2) The Canadian Journal
of Sociology 2013.
73 Walter Stahel, Circular Economy for Beginners (Ellen
MacArthur Foundation forthcoming) 32.
as they find that EPR measures have so far largely
failed to incentivise packaging producers towards eco-
design.74 Instead a concept like ‘producer liability’
would be much more effective as it goes far beyond
EPR.75 The discussion of the respective benefits and
limitations of responsibility compared to liability are
beyond the scope of this article. In recognition of its
weaker nature, EPR should not be adopted as a
standalone measure.
As a result of some of its disadvantages and
limitations, EPR is more likely to be useful and effective
as part of an integrated regulatory approach, where
there is a mix of law and policy instruments, including
economic instruments and complementary policies to
promote innovation.76 In particular, an economic
study by Arnaud demonstrated that EPR could be an
optimal policy if combined with bonus and penalty
systems.77 At the same time, combining EPR with
such instruments should be carefully evaluated before
adoption, as ‘we should keep in mind that regulations
that are too intrusive would contradict the essence of
EPR which is delegation’.78 Thus, EPR schemes need
to achieve the tricky balance of retaining the flexible
nature of EPR schemes, while introducing sufficient
complementary laws and policies to ensure such
schemes are effective. Such an assessment of the EPR
concept within the WFD is beyond the scope of this
paper, as this paper focuses solely on EPR rather than
the other mechanisms set out in the WFD that have
to or may be adopted alongside it.
3
EPR IN THE WFD BEFORE 2018
AMENDMENTS
In this section the EPR scheme as included in the
original version of the 2008 WFD is examined by
investigating the following three questions within the
context of the waste crises set out in Section 1 and the
possible forms, advantages, and limitations of the
concept of EPR set out in Section 2: (1) what is EPR
under the original 2008 WFD; (2) who is responsible
for what under EPR measures; and (3) when does a
producer’s EPR end, that is: when is a producer no
longer responsible under EPR? These questions are
both critical for understanding the EU’s
implementation as well as its limitations.
3.1 What is EPR in the 2008 WFD?
EPR was defined in neither the original 2008 WFD
nor its accompanying guidance document.79 It was
described in Recital 27 of the WFD as
one of the means to support the design
and production of goods which take
into full account and facilitate the
efficient use of resources during their
whole life cycle including their repair, re-
use, disassembly and recycling without
compromising the free circulation of
goods on the internal market.80
By introducing it as ‘one of the means’ the WFD
highlights that it is one part of a wider mix of law and
policy instruments likely to be required (as mentioned
in the final paragraph of the previous section).
Furthermore, the description in Recital 27 reflects the
rationale of EPR schemes generally as discussed in
Section 2, and also keeps the concept very open by not
Extended Producer Responsibility in the EU
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74 Watkins and others (n 71) 2.
75 Stahel (n 73) 30.
76 Annika Gottberg and others, ‘Producer Responsibility,
Waste Minimisation and the WEEE Directive: Case
Studies in Eco-design from the European Lighting Sector’
(2006) 359 Science of  the Total 38, 49; Brice Arnaud,
‘Extended Producer Responsibility and Green
Marketing: An Application to Packaging’ (2017) 67(2)
Environmental and Resource Economics 285; Jooyoung
Park, Nohora Díaz-Posada and Santiago Mejía-Dugand,
‘Challenges in Implementing the Extended Producer
Responsibility in an Emerging Economy: The End-of-
Life Tire Management in Colombia’ (2018) 189 Journal
of Cleaner Production 754, 754; Steenmans (n 19) 254.
77 Brice Arnaud, ‘Extended Producer Responsibility and
Green Marketing: An Application to Packaging’ (2017)
67(2) Environmental and Resource Economics 285.
78 Pierre Fleckinger and Matthieu Glachant, ‘The
Organization of Extended Producer Responsibility in
Waste Policy with Product Differentiation’ (2010) 59
Journal of Environmental Economics and Management
57, 66.
79 European Commission, Guidance on the Interpretation of
Key Provisions of  Directive 2008/98/EC on Waste (June 2012) 28.
80 2008 WFD, recital 27.
aligning with or limiting itself to a specific EPR type (as
set out in Section 2.1). Instead, Member States may
according to Article 8(1) of the 2008 WFD take ‘legislative
or non-legislative measures to ensure that any natural
or legal person who professionally develops, manufacturers,
processes, treats, sells or imports products (producer
of the product)’ has EPR. The requirement for other
measures demonstrates that EPR is not introduced as
a regulatory instrument in itself and should instead
applied through, for example, economic, legal, and
voluntary instruments.81 Instead, Kroepelien argues
that it ‘seems to establish itself between an instrument
and a goal as some kind of principle or concept’,82
while Forslind refers to it as an environmental strategy.83
Article 8(1) continues to provide some examples of
what such measures may include:
an acceptance of returned products and
of the waste that remains after those
products have been used, as well as the
subsequent management of the waste
and financial responsibility for such
activities. These measures may include
the obligation to provide publicly
available information as to the extent
to which the product is re-usable and
recyclable.
These examples focus specifically on physical, economic
and informative responsibilities in contrast to Recital
27, but as these are non-exhaustive the other EPR
types are not excluded.
EPR has therefore been left open to interpretation.
Such openness can offer flexibility, which in turn can
lead to innovation.84 This is one of the desired
outcomes of EPR as identified in Section 2.2:  for
producers to innovate and design their products with
a ‘cradle to cradle’ approach to product life cycles.85 For
this reason, EPR schemes are often implemented
through dynamic laws and policies schemes to allow
producers to respond to changes in market,
production and processing technologies.86 At the same
time, the lack of a common approach has led to
differing implementation and, more importantly,
performances across the EU.87 The current EU legal
architecture can thus promote a plurality of EPR ideas.
For example, one way in which the approaches differ
is that prevention of waste is not necessarily and
consistently prioritised by those implementing EPR
schemes.88 This is then an internal contradiction of
the concept, as the preventive principle arguably
provides a legal basis for the concept of EPR (see
Section 2.2). Article 8(2) of the 2008 WFD does state
that EPR measures may be taken ‘in order to ensure
that the recovery and disposal of products that have
become waste take place in accordance with Articles 4
and 13’,89 where Article 4 sets out the waste hierarchy
which prioritises prevention as the preferred option
for waste management. Article 4(2) of the 2008 WFD
permits deviation from the hierarchy where this is
justified, thereby altogether allowing different
approaches, but overall prevention should still be
encouraged.
3.2 Who is Responsible for What
Under EPR?
Under WFD EPR schemes, responsibility is assigned
to product producers. Product producers are defined
widely as ‘any natural or legal person who
professionally develops, manufactures, processes,
Law, Environment and Development Journal
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Responsibility – New Legal Structures for Improved
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RECIEL165, 166; Lee (n 60) 116; Chris van Rossem, Naoko
Tojo and Thomas Lindhqvist, Extended Producer
Responsibility: An Examination of its Impact on Innovation and
Greening Products (Greenpeace International 2006).
82 Kroepelien (n 81) 166.
83 Forslind (n 51) 620.
84 Jacques Pelkmans and Andrea Renda, ‘Does EU
Regulation Hinder or Stimulate Innovation’ (2014) CEPS
Special Report No. 96/November 2014, 8 <www.ceps.eu/
sys tem/f i l e s/No%2096%20EU%20Leg i s l a t ion%
20and%20Innovation.pdf>.
85 Kunz and others (n 26) 46.
86 Roland Clift, ‘The ECTEL Trials’ (1997) 1(2) Journal of
Industrial Ecology 3, 4; Reid Lifset and Thomas
Lindhqvist, ‘Trust, but Verify’ (2002) 5(2) Journal of
Industrial Ecology 9, 9; Reid Lifset and Thomas
Lindhqvist, ‘Producer Responsibility at a Turning Point?’
(2008) 12(3) Journal of Industrial Ecology 144, 144..
87 Watkins and others (n 71) 2.
88 Mark Dempsey and others, Individual Producer Responsibility:
A Review of Practical Approaches to Implementing Individual
Producer Responsibility for the WEEE Directive (Working
Paper, INSEAD Collection 2010/71/TOM/ISC, INSEAD
2010) 11; Lifset and others, (n 56) 162 and 165.
89 2008 WFD, art 8(2).
in relation to the Waste Electrical and Electronic
Equipment Directive is a ‘visible fee’, which is an
additional and identified cost charged to the customer.
It would be a defined standard fee that is applied across
a product category.94 But a number of  shortcomings
of these approaches have been identified in practice,
including that visible fees do not provide an incentive
for improvement in manufacturing products, and in
France where visible fees are mandatory it is uncertain
whether it has had any actual effect on the purchasing
patterns of consumers.95 Within the context of the
WEEE Directive, it is also arguable whether it clearly
aligns, as the WEEE Directive states that the financing
in respect of WEEE from private households and
other users for the collection, treatment, recovery, and
environmentally sound disposal of WEE should be
provided by producers.96 Visible fees could therefore
potentially apply to the concept of EPR more generally
within the WFD, but still requires further investigation
and clarification.
3.3 When is a Producer No Longer
Responsible Under EPR?
Following on from the previous question regarding
to whom EPR is assigned, the next question is: when
does it end? This is a particularly poignant question in
the case of littering, which is one of the key issues in
relation to plastic waste as highlighted in the
introductory section to this article. If a person has
littered plastic waste, then they are the ‘true’ polluters
and have committed an unlawful act, as abandonment
of waste is not permitted under Article 36 of the 2008
WFD, but this would not necessarily preclude EPR
from applying. If  an exception is made in the case of
littering, how can it be ensured that such a provision is
not abused? Similar to the previous questions explored
in the preceding sub-sections, clarification is required
to mitigate these issues.
treats, sells or imports products’.90 Regardless of the
relevant form of EPR as set out in Section 2.1, this
definition and the literature raises three critical
questions in identifying product producers: (1) how is
EPR distributed when a number of different actors
are involved in the production of a product (as often
there will not be just one legal entity that develops,
manufacturers, processes, treats, sells or imports
products, but instead this will often be different actors
across a supply chain, in part as a result of a product
being the result of different constituent components);
(2) what happens to the EPR of products of which
the producers have gone out of business;91 and (3)
who will pay for historical waste, that is those items
that are already in use and were not designed for
EPR?92
In relation to the first question, the Commission
requires there to be a clear allocation of responsibilities
between the different actors covered by the definition
at national level.93 In addition, some of these actor
types may comprise several stakeholders. For example,
many products are the result of a product-chain
involving a number of different actors (which is also a
key feature of the circular economy). A very simplified
example is a product containing microbeads, which
are manufactured solid plastic particles of less than
one millimetre, in a plastic container. Is the producer
of the container or the microbeads or the product
containing the microbeads responsible? Again, there
would need to be a clear agreement defining the
responsibility of each producer, or at least clearly stating
which producer has subsumed all the responsibility
for the final product.
The second and third questions can be addressed
together through similar mechanisms; in essence, the
waste of out-of-business producers could be treated
as historical waste. One of the main approaches
proposed to overcome the problem of historical waste
Extended Producer Responsibility in the EU
12
90 2008 WFD, art 8(1).
91 Lifset and Lindhqvist, ‘Producer Responsibility at a
Turning Point? (n 86) 144.
92 Roland Clift and Chris France, ‘Extended Producer
Responsibility in the EU: A Visible March of Folly’
(2006) 10(4) Journal of Industrial Ecology 5, 5.
93 European Commission, Development of Guidance on Extended
Producer Responsibility (EPR) (European Commission 2014)
122.
94 Eg NIRAS, ‘The Danish Voluntary Agreement on WEEE’
(February 2015) 10 and 12 <http://di.dk/
S i t e C o l l e c t i o n D o c u m e n t s / M i l j ø / N y h e d e r /
S a r a h s % 2 0 m a p p e % 2 0 - % 2 0 n y h e d e r / W E E E /
Dif fe ren t i a t ed%20Payment%20EN%20repor t .%
20docx.pdf>.
95 Clift and France (n 92) 5; NIRAS (n 94) 9.
96 WEEE Directive, arts 12 and 13. A full analysis of this
potential contradiction is beyond the scope of this paper
as the focus is on EPR within the WFD.
4
MOVING FORWARD
The previous sections have discussed the potential
benefits of EPR as well as the issues with its current
implementation at the EU level. This section now sets
out whether and to what extent amendments by
Directive 2018/851 to the 2008 WFD have addressed
the identified issues in Section 3: (1) is there a more
narrow understanding implemented of EPR to ensure
more consistent performance of EPR schemes (see
Section 3.1); (2) who is responsible for what under
EPR measures when multiple stakeholders are
involved and in relation to historical waste (see Section
3.2); and (2) are there instances where the actions of a
user of  a product ‘invalidate’ a producer’s EPR (Section
3.3). The amendments have only recently come into
force, so this section is limited to hypothesising about
the anticipated impacts. This section concludes by
looking at a proposed directive that will have an impact
on EPR schemes specially in relation to plastic waste.
4.1 2018 Amendments to EPR in
the WFD
When considering amendments to EPR within the
context of the WFD as amended by Directive 2018/
851, the most notable changes are the inclusion of a
definition of EPR and the introduction of general
minimum requirements for EPR schemes, which are
discussed in the following sections, as well as other
changes.97
4.1.1  Definition of EPR
A definition of EPR has been included as Article 3(21)
of the WFD in order to clarify the scopes of the
concept:98
97 WEEE and other Directives in which EPR schemes are
included have also affected EU conceptions and
implementations of EPR schemes. These are beyond
the scope of this paper in which the focus is only on
the EPR scheme generally under the WFD and Directive
2018/851. This is an area recommended for further
research.
98 Directive 2018/851, recital 9.
‘extended producer responsibility
scheme’ means a set of measures taken
by Member States to ensure that
producers of products bear financial
responsibility or financial and
organisational responsibility for the
management of the waste stage of a
product’s life cycle.
The interpretation of ‘producers of products’ remains
unchanged.99 This amendment limits EPR to the
economic responsibility type in addition to organisational
responsibility, which is additional to the four types
introduced by Lindhqvist (see Section 2.1). There is
however no further description or explanation of EPR,
and therefore the measure remains somewhat less open than
was the case previously, but nonetheless is still highly
flexible and vulnerable to inconsistent performances
of EPR schemes across the EU (see Section 3.1).
4.1.2  Introduction of General Minimum
Requirements
Minimum requirements for EPR schemes were
introduced in acknowledgement that EPR schemes
‘form an essential part of efficient waste management.
However, their effectiveness and performance differ
significantly between Member States’.100 The
minimum requirements can be summarised as:101
• Clearly define roles and responsibilities of
all relevant stakeholders (including producers
of products, organisations implementing
EPR obligations on behalf of other
stakeholders);
• Set waste management targets in line with
waste hierarchy;
• Establish a reporting system in order to
gather data on products placed on markets
by producers subject to EPR, and their
collection and treatment; and
• Ensure equal treatment of producers of
products regardless of origin and size.
99 2008 WFD, art 8(1).
100 Directive 2018/851, recital 21.
101 2008 WFD, art 8 a(1).
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Only the first minimum requirement directly links to
the one identified in Section 3: the first requirement
addresses the key issue covered in Section 3.2 by
requiring the identification of which stakeholder bears
what responsibility under an EPR scheme, but does
not provide guidelines or suggestions as to what is
expected, reasonable, or fair in the allocation of
responsibilities.
The other requirements may address and underpin
some of the advantages and disadvantages of the
concept of EPR described in Section 2. The second
listed requirement of setting waste management
targets provides an additional instrument, which may
support EPR as part of an integrated regulatory
approach, as discussed in Section 2.2.
Similarly, the third requirement of  reporting was not
explicitly identified, but again can contribute to a mix
of policy instruments and thus support an integrated
regulatory approach. Furthermore, this requirement
may also provide key data that can support reviews of
EPR schemes to increase their effectiveness.102 A
previous review of EPR for the purpose of managing
plastic waste found that EPR schemes are currently
not adequately controlled or monitored to ensure
effective and efficient functioning and producer
compliance.103 Reporting can ensure that schemes are
monitored, though systems will need to be put in
place to ensure that reports are then reviewed for
monitoring purposes. There are also challenges that
need to be overcome, as ‘[o]btaining accurate and
useful data for measuring and comparing collection
rates remains a significant challenge’ in many regions.104
This is potentially where technology and innovations
have a role – for example, blockchains has been touted
as a technology that can support general environmental
governance in relation to data collection and
monitoring.105
The last requirement of equal treatment will ensure
compliance with the general requirements of the free
movement of  goods (which, very briefly, requires there
to be no fiscal or non-fiscal barriers on goods within
the EU).106 This helps address concerns about
antitrust (anti-competitive behaviour), which was
identified as an issue by Clift, Lindhqvist and Lifset107
(but have not been considered in this paper).
The minimal requirements therefore provide a good
platform for improving the effectiveness of EPR
schemes, as they at least recognise some of the key
issues and challenges that need to be overcome for
implementing EPR schemes successfully, though they
do not provide detail or guidance on the details required
to overcome the challenges. As a result of this openness
and flexibility, it remains to see whether the minimum
requirements have the anticipated effects in practice
and results in increased clarity.
4.1.3  Other Amendments
Other amendments to the 2008 WFD incorporated
by Directive 2018/851 include changes to include
references to the general minimum requirements
provision. Additionally, the 2008 WFD now also
explicitly permits collective fulfilment of EPR
obligations.108 Some scholars state that collective EPR
undermines the environmental benefits from EPR as
it can dilute responsibility.109 Atasu states that
collective EPR need not be as bad as it
is assumed to be. The challenges
regarding the trade-offs between
collective and individual EPR
implementations … with respect to
their cost efficiency and design
implications can be overcome by
smarter-cost allocations, and more
research needs to be done to specifically
uncover how collective EPR affects
processing technology choices.110102 Kaffine and O’Reilly (n 27) 4; Watkins and others
(n 71) 2.
103 Watkins and others (n 71) 2.
104 Jessika Luth Richter and Rob Koppejan, ‘Extended
Producer Responsibility for Lamps in Nordic
Countries: Best Practices and Challenges in Closing
Material Loops’ (2016) 123 Journal of Cleaner Production
167, 174.
105 Katrien Steenmans, Ine Steenmans and Phillip Taylor,
‘Governing the Waste-Water-Energy-Food Nexus: Law
and the Role of  Blockchain Technology’ (under review).
106 Treaty on the Functioning of  the European Union
[2012] OJ C326/49, arts 30, 34-37 and 110.
107 Clift (n 86) 4; Lifset and Lindhqvist, ‘Trust, but Verify’
(n 86) 9; Lifset and Lindhqvist, ‘Producer Responsibility
at a Turning Point? (n 86) 144.
108 2008 WFD, art 8 a(4)(b).
109 Watkins and others (n 71) 2.
110 Atasu (n 65) 4. See also Fleckiner and Glachant (n 78).
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The advantages and shortcomings of individual and
collective approaches to EPR have not been considered
in this paper, but may be a relevant factor when the
effectiveness of amendments are assessed in potential
future research.
4.2 Developments on the Horizon
The importance of EPR for plastic waste has been
highlighted by the EU Strategy for Plastics in the
Circular Economy identifying it as a key tool for
providing economic incentives to increase recycling and
develop more sustainable plastic products.111 This is
further evidenced by its inclusion as one of the key
mechanisms in the proposal for a directive on the
reduction of the impact of certain plastic products on
the environment.112 This proposal has been
provisionally politically agreed by the European
Parliament and the Council of the European Union,
and is now awaiting formal approval.113 The proposal
requires EPR schemes, as defined in Article 3(21) of
the 2008 WFD, to be established for all single-use
plastic products listed in Part E of the Annex (ie food
containers, packets and wrappers, beverage containers,
cups for beverages, tobacco products with filters and
filters for use with tobacco products, wet wipes,
balloons, and lightweight plastic carriers bags)114 and
fishing gear containing plastic.115 A single-use plastic
product is defined as
a product that is made wholly or partly
from plastic and that is not conceived,
designed or placed on the market to
accomplish within its life span, multiple
trips or rotations by being returned to
the producer for refill or re-used for the
same purpose for which it was conceived.116
Definitions for plastic and fishing gear are also provided
in the proposed directive by Articles 3(1) and 3(3)
respectively. Extending the scope of  EPR schemes is a
positive and progressive step as many products are
still not covered by EPR schemes – for example, only
45 per cent of product and packaging waste within the
EU is covered by an EPR scheme currently.117
The EPR schemes in the proposed directive differ from
the 2008 WFD as it explicitly requires EPR schemes to
cover ‘the costs to clean up litter and the costs of the
awareness raising measures’.118 This provision makes
two critical contributions. First, it addresses the issue
of responsibility for littering discussed in Section 3.3.
Second, it highlights the key role of informative
responsibility. In particular, the raising awareness
measures need to inform consumers of the single-
use plastic products listed in Part G of the Annex [ie
the same products as those listed in Part E119 as well
as sanitary towels] and fishing gear containing plastic
about the following:
(a) the available re-use systems and
waste management options for
those products and fishing gear
containing plastic as well as best
practices in sound waste
management …
(b) the impact of littering and other
inappropriate waste disposal of
those products and fishing gear
containing plastic on the
environment, and in particular on
the marine environment.
This is an important addition to EPR schemes,
particularly as recent increased societal awareness of
plastic waste problems120 has resulted in 62 per cent
of  surveyed UK audiences to make lifestyle changes
to reduce plastic pollution,121 and actions such as the
111 Commission (n 14) 7, 10-13 and 15.
112 Commission (n 15) art 8.
113 European Commission, ‘Single-use Plastics: Commission
Welcomes Ambitious Agreement on New Rules to
Reduce Marine Litter’ (European Commission – Press Release,
19 December 2018) <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_IP-18-6867_en.htm>.
114 Commission (n 15) art 8(1),
115 ibid art 8(3).
116 ibid art 1(2).
117 Zero Waste Europe, ‘Extended Producer Responsibility:
Creating the Frame for Circular Products’ (2017)
<www.zerowasteeurope.eu/w p-content/uploads/
2017/01/EPRpolicypaper.pdf>.
118 Commission (n 15) art (2).
119 See text to n 114.
120 See text to n 1–3.
121 BBC, ‘BBC Announces Major Initiative “Plastics Watch”
Following the Global Impact of Blue Planet II’ (BBC, 23
June 2018) <www.bbc.co.uk/mediacentre/latestnews/
2018/plastics-watch?lang=gd>.
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proposal of the strongest ban on microbeads in the
world to date in the UK.122 As the traditional
emphasis on economic responsibility has so far failed
to result in widespread effective EPR schemes, the
increased informative responsibility could perhaps
result in bigger changes if  adopted.
5
CONCLUDING REMARKS
The main contribution of this article has been as a
first doctrinal exploration of the anticipated effects of
amendments to the 2008 WFD as a result of Directive
2018/851. In particular, this article has focused on the
new provisions affecting EPR schemes. Under the
original 2008 WFD, EPR could be interpreted very
widely and resulted in many different (and ineffective)
approaches, and there was uncertainty regarding who
was responsible for what in product-chains and how
long a producer remained responsible. The
amendments have addressed some of these issues.
EPR is now defined, albeit still broadly – it has been
narrowed to economic, and organisational
responsibility, but for the rest remains a very flexible
mechanism. It is expected that this will have a negligible
effect on current operations of EPR schemes, as
economic responsibility is already the dominant type
in action. Another key amendment has been the
introduction of the minimum requirements for EPR
schemes, which does not resolve the issues
surrounding allocation of EPR, but at least state that
this must be provided when implementing such
schemes. Overall, the amendments have addressed
some of the issues of EPR schemes, but they have
largely been limited to skimming the surface of the
problems rather than addressing their crux (such as in
the case of introducing a definition without addressing
some of the issues of the different content and broad
nature of EPR schemes). Further research is therefore
needed to explore what would provide an effective
solution to reap the intended benefits of EPR
schemes.
122 Louisa Casson, ‘Microbeads – We Won’ (Greenpeace, 21
July 2017) <www.greenpeace.org.uk/microbeads-we-
won>.
Currently the impact of EPR schemes is also limited
as a result of only being required at EU level for
packaging waste and end of life vehicles. There is a
proposal to require EPR schemes for single-use
plastics, which would be an important step in
expanding its scope. It must, however, be
remembered that EPR cannot address the problem
of plastic (or any other) waste on its own. EPR should
be part of an integrated regulatory approach in which
it is complemented by other mutually supportive laws
and policies, such as targets and eco-design.
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